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The Age of ‘Depoliticisation’ and
‘Dejuridification’
and its ‘Logic of Assembling’: An Essay
Against the Instrumentalist Use of
Comparative Law’s Geopolitics
DR. LUCA SILIQUINI-CINELLI*
Abstract While comparative law has become a key discipline, its
instrumentalist use has turned out to be a powerful weapon: it is the
‘pen’ by which the identity of and differences in law’s geopolitics are
continually written and rewritten. Given its attractive functionalist essence, comparative law is gaining increasing international credit as a
way of developing newer theories of sovereignty and governance in a
framework in which law is conceived of less as a set of rules and more
as a symbolic vestimentum of global soft power. The present contribution critically investigates the relationship between distortive views of
comparative law’s geopolitics and the intimate essence of the doctrine
aimed at creating the ‘aspatial’, unbounded, illimitable (and hence intangible) liberal global order whose governance appears to transcend the
idea and form(s) of law through which the ‘politicization’ and ‘juridification’ of modernity have been achieved in the last century. In doing so,
it also addresses why such an alliance has made it easier to ‘discover’
* This contribution is based on a paper that I presented on September 19, 2014 at the Graduate
Legal Research Conference Divergence and Dissent in Legal Globalization, held by Católica
Global Law School (CGLS), Lisbon, and that I am due to present on October 25, 2014, at the
Conference De-juridification: Appearance and Disappearance of Law at a Time of Crisis, IVR
International Association of Legal and Social Philosophy, UK Branch, held at the Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). I would like to thank José Lobo
Moutinho, Jan Dalhuisen, Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro, and Tito Rendas for inviting me to CGLS,
and Maksymilian Del Mar, Massimo Renzo, and Emmanuel Melissaris, who generously invited
me to LSE. I am also indebted to the participants at both conferences who provided me with critically constructive comments, and to the editors of The Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review for their assistance throughout the publication process. I am particularly grateful to Danuta Mendelson for her valuable comments on an earlier draft.

215

SILIQUINI-CINELLI_FINAL_FOR_PUB

216

2/24/2016 2:07 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 37:215

and ‘sell’ the smooth and rectilinear land of the figuratively unspoken
and unwritten as the terra incognita that lies over what is created by the
constructivist political intervention(s) of the modern nation-state.
Keywords Global order; geopolitics, comparative law; legal
scholarship; political theology
‘Hen kai pan!’
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing
1780
“[T]hat men can use their own knowledge in the pursuit of their
own ends without colliding with each other
only if clear boundaries can be drawn between their respective
domains of free action,
is the basis on which all known civilization has grown.”
Friedrich Hayek
Law, Legislation and Liberty, [1973] 2013, 102
“[B]ut if ‘openness’ itself can result in the paralysis of the openness,
then we are dealing with self-destruction.”
Leszek Kolakowski
Modernity on Endless Trial, 1990, 162
“To reject the biological and symbolic dimension [of the law]
leads to [the] insanity of treating humans
as mere animals or as pure mind, subject to no limits that are not
self-imposed.”
Alain Supiot
Homo Juridicus, 2007 (2005), ix
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the essence and perils of what I will
define as the instrumentalist use of comparative law’s geopolitics. Its
main claim is that this is an age in which the definition of the space by
which law makes itself ontologically representable and tangible through
its ‘annunciation’ is instrumentally manipulated by internal and external
forces simultaneously. Yet it could be noted that this has always been
the case in the West. As will emerge in due course, this contention
would surely be correct. However, what contradistinguishes the current
de-juridification of law’s regulative instances is the scale that the phenomenon has reached, as well as its post-historical and post-political es-
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sence.1 A powerful example of this is the impact on both political and
comparative legal theory of the liberal doctrine aimed at creating the
“aspatial,” unlimited, unbounded, and hence ontologically intangible
economic global order. The World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank have been actively working on this since the late 1990s. This doctrine’s final goal is
the formal “depoliticisation” and “dejuridification” of the world. I have
discussed this neutralizing trend elsewhere.2
Delving into this framework from a different, yet complementary,
perspective, in this paper I criticize the liberal global-order project and
the instrumentalist use of both political and comparative legal reasoning
which supports it. In doing so, I investigate the threat posed by the creation of this totalizing dimension3 for both the Schmittian “political” and
“sovereign,” and for the rule of law.4
Section II begins with the description of the essence and features
of universalized liberalism, its “logic of assembling” in Legendrian
terms, and its implications for both political and legal theory. Section III
explores why jurists (having been defined as the militia legum by Baldus5) found themselves deprived of the role of guardians of law’s uncanny presence because of the positivistic dicta of the artificial Leviathan that rendered “law” synonymous with “legislation.” Consequently,
attention is paid to the reasons why a great deal of comparative legal
scholarship is trying to reclaim its leading role by influencing and supporting the post-national, anti-state policies that perceive the deliberative law-making process (brought about by the French Revolution and
its constructivist rationalism in Hayekian terms) as the obstacle to overcome, and the “cohabitation” of different national legal systems as the
problem to be solved. In this paper I also explain why the success of the
liberal global order doctrine is related to the global “aspatial turn” that
legal and sociopolitical theories are undergoing, which is overcoming
the classic idea of “space” as a “representative surface.” The conclusive
1. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Hayek the Schmittian, Contextualising Cristi’s Account of Hayek’s Decisionism in the Age of Global Wealth Inequality, 24GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (forthcoming
2015).
2. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, ‘Against Interpretation?’ On Global (Non-)Law, the Breaking-up
of Homo Juridicus and the Disappearance of the Jurist, 8 J. CIV. L. STUD., (forthcoming 2015).
3. See ANDREW HURRELL, ON GLOBAL ORDER: POWER, VALUES, AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 184 (2007).
4. For an introduction to the Schmittian political and sovereign, see CARL SCHMITT,
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 63 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed. 2005) (1922) [hereinafter POLITICAL
THEOLOGY].)
5. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL
POLITICAL THEORY 124 (Princeton Univ. Press 1957).

SILIQUINI-CINELLI_FINAL_FOR_PUB

218

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

2/24/2016 2:07 PM

[Vol. 37:215

remarks are dedicated to the paradoxes of the instrumentalist and manipulative use of comparative law’s geopolitics.
II. THE LIBERAL GLOBAL ORDER PROJECT, ITS LEGENDARIAN “LOGIC OF
ASSEMBLING”AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE SCHMITTIAN “POLITICAL”
AND “SOVEREIGN”
The first claim of this paper is that, in this current period in the
West, law is profoundly transformed by internal and global external
forces simultaneously. Additionally, the definition of the space by
which it makes itself ontologically representable and tangible through
its signification is continuously manipulated for practical purposes.
This is not surprising. The West, as we know it today, is the product of an instrumentalist use of Western logic of memory, historicity of
politics, and sociology of law. As a comparatist, I am profoundly interested in the postmodern and neorealist phases of this phenomenon and,
in particular, the role that the instrumentalist use of comparative law’s
geopolitics plays in its current development.
It is my suggestion that the contemporary deliberative manipulation of comparative law and legal reasoning is intrinsically related to the
doctrine that the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, have been actively working since the late 1990s that is aimed at creating an “aspatial,” boundless, illimitable, and intangible global order based on a scheme of intelligibility opposed to that of the modern nation-state. In particular,
through what Legendre defined as the “logic of assembling,”6 which inevitably implies an a priori deconstruction, the liberal global order project is imposing the sterile, instrumentalist ufficium of global governance on us. This supra-national dicta aims at the mere administration of
the world and transcends the idea and form(s) of law through which the
“politicization” and “juridification” of modernity was achieved in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.7
Bearing in mind Kolakowski’s inquiry into the perils of the liberal
model of the ‘open society’,8 it is reasonable to argue that, (notwithstanding Hayek’s account of the necessity of boundaries to preserve the
legal order)9 the global Oikoumene scheme is ultimately based on liber6. PIERRE LEGENDRE, L’OCCIDENTE INVISIBILE 41 (Medusa Edizioni ed., Paolo Heritier
trans. 2009) (2004).
7. I therefore do not agree with Cohen’s vision of a ‘dualistic’ global order. See JEAN L
COHEN, GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
8. LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MODERNITY ON ENDLESS TRIAL 162–75 (Univ. of Chi. Press
1998).
9. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 101–05 (Univ. of Chi. Press et al.
1973).
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alism’s (and, thus, romanticism’s)10 political sin, as expressed by Habermas’s early work and Ackerman’s expectations11 –the belief that its
endless negotiations can always be inclusive.12 This is constantly implemented through the deliberative, instrumentalist and revolutionary
use of law’s geopolitics as imposed by the French Revolution and its
constructivist rationalism.13 The Schmittian ‘sovereign’ is displaced
from this view, and not capable of any concrete intervention.14 The recently renewed interest in theories suggesting that governments should
cut their debt by selling their political and economic assets is testament
to this15 and makes it evident the extent reached by the ‘civilized economy’ and ‘good economic governance’ models.16
There is, however, a mistake and a paradox in this view. The mistake, as Paul W. Kahn correctly notes, is “to think that law without sov10. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL ROMANTICISM xvii (Guy Oakes trans., Transaction Publishers 1986) [hereinafter POLITICAL ROMANTICISM].
11. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (Yale Univ. Press 1980);
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Nicholsen trans. 1983); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORM:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans.,
MIT Press 1996).
12. PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN 53-60 (Princeton Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter OUT OF
EDEN]; PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 175 (Columbia Univ. Press 2012); PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS
PLACE 37 (2006); POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 4, at 63. In a quite approximate and unsatisfactory way, Schmitt, who was a (if not the) leading jurist and political theorist in Germany during the period after World War I, will always be remembered for his associations with the National Socialists (he joined the party in 1933 and left it in 1936), the prelude to which was the
publication in 1921, of Die Diktatur, in which he argued in favour of commissarial forms of dictatorship to deal with extraordinary circumstances. For a compelling inquiry into the relationship
that Schmitt had with the Nazi party, see POLITICAL ROMANTICISM, supra note 10, at ix–xxxv.
To understand the growing interest in Schmitt’s thought, see Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Legal Systemology and the Geopolitics of Roman Law: A Response to Stuart Elden’s Critique of Carl
Schmitt’s Spatial Ontology, 1 PÓLEMOS J.L. LIT. & CULTURE, (forthcoming 2015).
13. David Dessler & John Owen, Constructivism and the Problem of Explanation: A Review
Article, 3 PERSPECT. POLIT. 597, 604 (2005).
14. Id.
15. According to the IMF, non-financial assets such as land, subsoil resources, and buildings
in the countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are
worth around $35 trillion. Additionally, state-owned enterprises are worth around $2 trillion, and
there is a further $2 trillion in local government utilities and/or assets. For a discussion of the
(Jan.
11,
2014),
foregoing,
see
The
$9
Trillion
Sale,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21593453-governments-should-launch-new-waveprivatisations-time-centred-property-9; Setting Out the Store, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/node/21593458/comments. The predomination of economics over
ideology and politics on the European continent is revealed, for instance, by the fact that in 2013,
Euro-area governments were required for the first time to submit national budgets to the European Commission for judgment before final submission to national parliaments.
16. Siliquini-Cinelli, supra note 2.
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ereignty . . . has solved the problem of perpetuating its own existence.”17
The paradox is that, notwithstanding the mystifying soft nature of universalized liberalism as expressed by its administrative, rather than juristic and political essence, its effects are anything but legally neutral or
apolitical.
Elsewhere,18 I have asserted that the postmodern and neorealist
phases of what I define as the “Europeanisation of Europe” and its tragic “statelessness fantasy” are nothing more than the continental paradigm of this project, and its current proof. In the same context, I also
claimed that standard approaches to pluralist, insulated channels of
post-national governance (“PNG”) fall short in providing the theoretical
and practical elements that we need to understand why PNG is also the
instrument used by the promoters of the intangible liberal global order.
To overcome these limitations, I maintained that any study of the essence, structures, aims, challenges, and limitations of PNG should also
investigate how this particular law functions (that is, how it makes itself
visible and ontologically tangible through the process of its signification
to become the law). This necessity is related to the fact that PNG is
characterized, in my opinion, by the transcendence of Carl Schmitt’s
“nomos der Erde,” which was about taking, sharing, and dividing spaces and resources in order to make forms of power and domain publicly
visible.19
So the question arises: why are the breaking up of Homo juridicus20 and the formally apolitical administrative ufficium of global governance taking place? Because the increasing predominance of econom17. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 12 at 56.
18. I have discussed this further in “Escaping the Cage: Why the Implementation of Pluralist, Insulated Forms of Post-National Subsidiary Governance Might Represent the Only Solution
to the European Crises” paper presented at the 6th CEE Forum for Young Legal, Political and
Social Theorists, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb in May 2014, and in “The Lure of PostNational European Private Law as a Semi-Stateless Scheme of Intelligibility: A ‘Multi-Layered’,
‘Inter-Institutional’, ‘Networked’ Order or a ‘Semi-Hierarchical’ Nomos?” paper presented at the
Law in a Changing Transnational World – A Workshop for Young Scholars, hosted in October
2013 by The Zvi Meitar Center For Advanced Legal Studies at The Buchmann Faculty of Law,
Tel Aviv University.
19. The Greek term nomos is derived from another Greek term, nemein, which, depending
on the context, means ‘to divide’, to pasture’, ‘to distribute’, or ‘to posses’. See CARL SCHMITT,
THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPEAUM 67
(Gary Ulmen trans., Telos Publ’g Press 2006) (1950).
20. See ALAIN SUPIOT, HOMO JURIDICUS: ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE
LAW (Saskia Brown, trans., Verso 2007); Peter Goodrich, Intersititium and Non-Law,
in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 213, 215 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012) [hereinafter
Intersititium and Non-Law]; Peter Goodrich, Law’s Labour’s Lost, 72 MOD. L. REV. 296, 298
(2009). I have discussed this further in ‘Against Interpretation?’, supra note 2.
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ics over politics, that is to say, the economic structure determines the
political and legal one.21 This seems to be confirmed, in Muir Watt’s
words, by the current “loss of relevance of territory in global economy.”22 More precisely, as Mazzucato writes, “[I]n most parts of the
world we are witnessing a massive withdrawal of the State, one that has
been justified in terms of debt reduction and – perhaps more systematically – in terms of rendering the economy more ‘dynamic’, ‘competitive’ and ‘innovative’.”23 Yet it would be unforgivable not to specify
that the process of dissolving the spatiality of identity, sensibility, and
culture through the fight against the political and legal leading role of
the sovereign nation-state is primarily related to the historicogeographical lesson(s) taught by modern capitalism.24 In this sense, it
should be noted that the map of domination of the world’s representative spaces changed in the period between 1850 and 1914, after the revolutionary upsurge of 1848 that followed the depression sweeping out
of Britain in 1846–1847.25 The words of Alfred Marshall (“the influence
of time is more fundamental than that of space”26), as well as Émile Zola’s La Terre, and De Chirico’s paintings of 1910–14 (specifically, The
Philosopher’s Conquest), and Martin Heidegger’s The Thing and The
Question Concerning Technology are testament to this. Stephen Kern
asked in his The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918, what modernism is, if not the response to a crisis in the experience of space and
time.27 Paraphrasing Kern’s words, we should ask what (in our neorealist global age and in the wake of the fall of the postmodern “bipolar system”) the role of economics plays in influencing the essence and spatiality of law’s geopolitics in terms of cultural signification.28 As Marx
21. Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 INT’L
ORG. 595, 596-97 (1995).
22. Horatia Muir Watt, On the Waning Magic of Territoriality in the Conflict of Law,
in TOM BINGHAM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LAW: A LIBER AMICORUM 751 (Mads
Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
23. MARIANNA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING THE PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE MYTH IN RISK AND INNOVATION 1 (Anthem Press 2013); see also SUPIOT, supra note
20, at 100-09, 145-84.
24. See DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 263 (Blackwell Publishing
1989) (writing that Gustave Flaubert explored “the question of representation of heterogeneity
and difference, of simultaneity and synchrony, in a world where both and space are being absorbed under the homogenizing power of money and commodity exchange.”) See also DAVID
HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL: AND THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM (Profile Books 2010)
[hereinafter THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL].
25. HARVEY, supra note 24, at 263-64.
26. Id. at 265.
27. See Generally STEPHEN KERN, THE CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE 11 (Harvard Univ.
Press ed. 1983).
28. Id.
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commented, the question is why and how the economic structure determines the political one.29
The relevance of my proposed analysis is made evident by the content of the Doing Business reports of 2004 and 2005.30 The WTO members partly used these reports at the ninth ministerial conference, held in
Bali in December 2013, to sign the first comprehensive agreement since
the WTO was founded, involving an effort to simplify (rectius, dissolve) the procedures for doing business across borders and redesign the
economic geography of the world market.31 In writing the Doing Business series, the WTO, IMF, and World Bank called for the adoption of a
modus procedendi that perceives (the) law as nothing more than an
aspatial normative framework in which the only benchmarks that should
be considered relevant are the legal sources, rules of interpretation, and
the courts’ organization. Furthermore, by adopting the “Law and Finance” approach promoted by Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine, which
refers to the Economic Analysis of Law,32 the Doing Business reports
effectively asserted that the competition among different legal systems
is ultimately won by those more capable of protecting institutional
global investors by (also) reducing market(s’) costs. Lastly, because
Civil law systems tend to create institutions that implement the state’s
power33, the Doing Business reports suggested that such a result is best
achieved and protected by Common law systems.34 The “efficiency test”
29. Id.
30. See INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV./THE WORLD BANK, DOING
BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH (World Bank, Int’l Fin. Corp., & Oxford
Univ.
Press
2005),
available
at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/Doing%20Business/Documents/AnnualReports/English/DB05-FullReport.pdf.
31. The deal was the first ‘success’ of the Doha Round. The full package could add about
$1trillion to world trade by cutting the cost of shipping goods around the world by more than 10
percent, raising global output by over $400 billion a year and giving developing nations more
scope to increase farm subsidies. (NC HERE) For a recent inquiry into how global economic
governance issues determine the trajectory of national politics, see Daniel D Bradlow, A Framework for Assessing Global Economic Governance, 36 B. C. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 971, 971-73
(2013). To understand why the IMF and the World Bank are buffeted by institutional crisis and
policy conflicts, see WALDEN BELLO, CAPITALISM’S LAST STAND? 181–202 (Zed Books 2013).
32. Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10126, 2003),available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10126.
33. For example, Common law systems promote a more market-centered political economy
than Civil law systems. See John C. Reitz, Comparative Law and Political Economy, in
COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 105, 126-27 (David S. Clark ed., Edward Elgar Publ’g., 2012).
34. I use capital ‘C’ to refer to the Common law as a legal tradition. Common (with an uppercase c) law and common law are two different things: while the former is a legal tradition
marked by a number of particular characteristics, the latter refers to only a part of the Common
law (and includes elements of both case law and customary law).
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adopted by both reports and according to which “wealth maximization
becomes an explanation of the development of the (common law)”35
make it clear that Gunter Teubner is wrong when he claims that global
law “is a law whose ‘centre’ is created by the ‘peripheries’ and remains
dependent on them.”36 Importantly, both reports have been vehemently
criticized by the French Capitant Report, published in 2006, because of
their limited and superficial purview of enquiry and obvious paradoxes
(e.g., it was argued that Anglo-American law is inevitably classist, and
that, as Monateri pointed out, the “Law and Finance” doctrine is nothing more than “inverted Marxism”).37
The French critique should be taken into serious account. Despite
what may be suggested to the contrary, according to the WTO, IMF,
and World Bank, the solution for rendering economies more “dynamic,”
“competitive,” and “innovative” does not come from the implementation of the rule of law through its local representations and ways of legitimation and recognition.38 Rather, the solution is the dissolution of
the “spatiality” of the targeted legal systems (and identity of cultures
underneath) and the essence of the “political” in Schmittian terms. 39
Such a process is evidently part of the movement towards theories
of (non-) sovereignty and governance in a global framework in which
law is not only perceived as a set of rules, but also a relevant symbolic
vestimentum of global soft power.40 The substitution of local govern35. Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi, Comparative Law and Economics: Accounting for
Social Norms, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 92, 93 (Edward Elgar Publ’g., 2012).
36. Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 12 (Gunter Teubner ed., Brookfield 1997).
37. PIER MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO 27-34 (2013) as translated by the author.
38. Id. at 27-28.
39. See id. at 54-56.
40. See id. at 26-27. Scholarship on the global governance issue seems endless. For an introduction, see JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS, AND GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2009); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER (Princeton Univ. Press 2004); Julian Arato, Constitutionality and Constitutionalism Beyond the State: Two Perspectives on the Material Constitution of the United Nations, 10 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 627 (2012); Maksymilian Del Mar, Beyond the State in and of Legal Theory, in
CONCEPTS OF LAW: COMPARATIVE, JURISPRUDENTIAL, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 1941 (Seàn Patrick Donlan & Lukas Heckendorn-Urscheler eds., Ashgate 2014); Nils Jansen & Ralf
Michaels, Beyond the State? Rethinking Private Law: Introduction to the Issue, 56 AM. J. COMP.
L. 527 (2008); Nico Krisch, Global Governance as Public Authority: an Introduction, 10 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 976 (2012); Nicole Roughan, The Relative Authority of Law: A Contribution to “Pluralist Jurisprudence”, in NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 254 (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011);
CHARLES F. SABEL & JONATHAN ZEITLIN, EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: TOWARDS A NEW ARCHITECTURE (Oxford Univ. Press 2010); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Filling Power Vacuums in the Global Legal Order, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 919 (2013);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L.
283 (2004); Bas van der Vossen, Legitimacy and Multi-Level Governance, in NEW WAVES IN
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ment with aspatial global governance is what we should delve into if we
are to understand that what the liberal global-order project renders insignificant is the Schmittian “exception” together with the related notion
of sovereign and democratic “friend/enemy” (or “us/them”) antithesis
which makes politics possible.41 In this sense, the recent referendum in
which Switzerland decided to bring back strict immigration quotas for
Europeans may be seen as a tentative step towards rediscovering the
(democratic) significance of the democratic “friend/enemy” antithesis,
and hence of politics, as opposed to the sterile administrative vacuum
promoted by the universalization of liberal thought and Europe’s (tragic) “statelessness fantasy.”42
That the West is not capable of understanding the perils of this
progression should not surprise anyone. While questioning the delusion
of those holding Western values, Samuel P. Huntington claimed,
“Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three
problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous.”43 He then maintained that these problems are directly related to what he defined as the
“global identity crisis.”44 He was right. Yet his claim can only be fully
understood if we bear in mind that Western civilization long ago
stopped delving into the question of its identity and, through the adoption and incessant implementation of a deliberatively shaped set of concepts, has always experienced the instrumentalist and manipulative
creation, disruption, and recreation of its memory.45 This means that the
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 233-53 (Maksymilian Del Mar ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2011); Peer
Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 191 (2007).
41. According to Schmitt, to decide is to decide both for and against and inevitably implies
the predominance of will over reason. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 2627 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (1927) [hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL]. Similarly,
Derrida claimed that “[n]o justice is exercised, no justice is rendered, no justice becomes effective
nor does it determine itself in the form of law, without a decision that cuts and divides.” Jacques
Derrida, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, in ACTS OF RELIGION 230, 252
(Gil Anidjar ed., Routledge 2010).
42. See Luca Siliquini-Cinelli and Bétrice Schütte, Conceptualizing the Schmittian Exception in the European Union: From ‘Opt-out’ Procedure(s), to Indirect Forms of Secessionism, 15
CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, 1 (2015).
43. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 310 (Simon & Schuster, 1996).
44. Id. at 125.
45. The (sad) circumstance that the West has lost faith in the traditions and memories that
have made it and its principles “have been falling into increasing disregard and oblivion” is the
canon of Hayek’s inquiry into the constitution of liberty. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 1-8 (Routledge 2006) (1960). The most striking evidence of this
phenomenon is that, paradoxically, the West does not even have geopolitical boundaries and thus
cannot be properly defined in terms of “west” either. That the ontological disposition of Western

SILIQUINI-CINELLI_FINAL_FOR_PUB

2015]

2/24/2016 2:07 PM

The Age of ‘Depoliticisation’ and ‘Dejuridification’

225

West, as we know it today, is the result of the literary reinterpretation
and voluntary distortion of its historicity of politics and sociology of
law for practical purposes.46 In particular, the West has been built on
(non-)culture has shifted from the Greece of Thucydides to the U.S. and, in part, the Eastern side
of the Southern hemisphere is testament to this. On the (non-)identity of the West, see generally
the monumental investigation conducted in MARTIN BERNAL, BLACK ATHENA: AFROASIATIC
ROOTS OF CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION (Rutgers Univ. Press, 1987); see also SAMUEL ANGUS, THE
MYSTERY-RELIGIONS AND CHRISTIANITY: A STUDY IN THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF EARLY
CHRISTIANITY (Dover 1975) (1928); HANNAH ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND (1978); ALEIDA
ASSMAN, CULTURAL MEMORY AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION (2011); JAN ASSMANN, MOSES THE
EGYPTIAN: THE MEMORY OF EGYPT IN WESTERN MONOTHEISM (Harvard Univ. Press, 1998)
[herinafter MOSES THE EGYPTIAN]; JAN ASSMANN, THE PRICE OF MONOTHEISM (2010) [hereinafter THE PRICE OF MONOTHEISM]; JAN ASSMANN, CULTURAL MEMORY AND EARLY
CIVILIZATION: WRITING, REMEMBRANCE, AND POLITICAL IMAGINATION (2011) [hereinafter
CULTURAL MEMORY AND EARLY CIVILIZATION]; JAN ASSMANN, RELIGIO DUPLEX: HOW THE
ENLIGHTENMENT REINVENTED EGYPTIAN RELIGION (2014); MARTIN BERNAL, BLACK ATHENA
WRITES BACK (Duke Univ. Press 2006); ERIC BERNE, BEYOND GAMES AND SCRIPTS (1976);
JONATHAN BOYARIN, REMAPPING MEMORY: THE POLITICS OF TIMESPACE (1994); FRANCIS M
CORNFORD, FROM RELIGION TO PHILOSOPHY (Dover 2004) (1912); FRANZ V. M CUMONT,
ORIENTAL RELIGIONS IN ROMAN PAGANISM (Echo Library 2008) (1911); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON,
WHO ARE WE? (2004); PERSONAL IDENTITY (John Perry ed., 1975); MARY L. LEFKOWITZ &
GUY M. ROGERS, BLACK ATHENA REVISITED (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1996); DAN P.
MCADAMS, THE STORIES WE LIVE BY: PERSONAL MYTHS AND THE MAKING OF THE SELF (1st
ed. 1993); W.O.E OESTERLEY & THEODORE H. ROBINSON, HEBREW RELIGION: ITS
DEVELOPMENT AND ORIGIN (1930); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1st ed.
1993); MICHAEL ALAN SIGNER, MEMORY AND HISTORY IN CHRISTIANITY AND JUDAISM (2001);
ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGIN OF NATIONS (B. Blackwell, 1986); SIR WILLIAM W.
TARN & G.T. GRIFFITH, HELLENISTIC CIVILIZATION (Edward Arnold Pub. Ltd. 1966); CHARLES
TAYLOR, THE MALAISE OF MODERNITY (1991); VICTOR TCHERIKOVER, HELLENISTIC
CIVILIZATION AND THE JEWS (Baker Publishing) (1959); JAMES TULLY, STRANGE
MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956-1972 (1973); Michael S Roth, We Are
What
We
Remember,
TIKKUN
MAGAZINE
(Nov/Dec.
1994)
available
at
http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/nov1994_roth;
46. Unfortunately, the scope of our study does not allow us to delve into this topic adequately. Yet the instrumentalist use of the ‘exception’ within the Christian creed is of particular interest
here. Although Jesus emphasized the moral side of life in preference to the purely formal aspect
of legal observance, he is never shown in conflict with current practice of the law. The single exception is the plucking of heads of grain on the Sabbath (see Luke 6:1-5). Yet, as David Flusser
correctly writes, “[t]he general opinion was that on the Sabbath it was permissible to pick up fallen heads of grain and rub them between the fingers. According to Rabbi Yehuda, also a Galilean,
it was even permissible to rub them in one’s hand.” DAVID FLUSSER, JESUS 58 (Hebrew Univ.
Magnes Press 3rd ed. 2001) (1968). It is clear that the essence of the manipulative distortion came
from Jesus’s disciples, who wrote the (no longer extant) documents in Hebrew; these were translated into Greek for the Alexandrian Jews, and then further elaborated through various stages of
redaction until finally being employed by the Synoptic evangelists. In order to make the scene
more vivid, the Synoptic evangelists added the statement about plucking the wheat as the act of
transgression that confirmed Jesus’s superior authority. Both this (unreal) episode and the “divine
conflict” between God and the crucified Jesus as described in Moltmann’s The Crucified God
may be considered as the first Schmittian state of exception in political theology, from which
Christianity, and hence the West as we know it today, originated. See ‘Against Interpretation?’,
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(and promoted through) memories that have always been seen as true
because they were instrumentally arranged by their guardians. Hence,
these memories are anything but “true” in absolute terms: as Jan and
Aleida Assmann have persuasively claimed,47 they just have to be kept
alive as “pure and genuine memories”, independent from any historiographical legitimation (mnemohistory).48
This fanatic trend of Machiavellian creation, abolition, and change
of the Western logic of memory forces us to ask ourselves on what basis
the West knows itself and produces (and sells) its own cultural, sociopolitical and ontological image (or test, as Legendre would say49). Answering this question is not an easy task for at least two reasons. First, we
live in a period in which even the topological and topographical notions,
and local sensibility of presentification of the West, or of the values it
promotes, are unclear. Second, the introduction of Christianity into Europe, and its further Hellenization and theologization,50 produced the
first major (violent and exceptional51) discontinuity in the Western evolution of both law and politics as they emerged from tribal social customs.
Only when we consider the blurriness of this scenario and unite it
with history’s lessons about law’s need for spatial signifiers that the
threat posed by the formal “depoliticization” and “dejuridification” of
the world to the rule of law (which is a doctrine and not, as it may be
contrarily suggested, a principle52) becomes evident. Seeing that the
Oikoumene is characterized by the uniformity of politics, culture, and
legislation, it may not be considered a territory in spatio-ontological
supra note 2.
47. See generally JAN ASSMANN, MOSES THE EGYPTIAN, supra note 45; THE PRICE OF
MONOTHEISM, supra note 45; CULTURAL MEMORY AND EARLY CIVILIZATION, supra note 45.
48. The first historian who addressed the extinguishing of the individual through the experience of alienation of the historical consciousness was Leopold von Ranke. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermenuetical Problem, in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 32
(David E. Linge ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 2004) (1996). To understand how history has altered its
position in relation to the document by making it a ‘monument’ through which memories are deliberatively promoted, see generally MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
(Routledge 2002) (1969).
49. Culture, according to Legendre, is the construction of a discourse, and its memory depends on our use of the geology of its texts. See Legendre, supra note 6.
50. For an introduction on the sociopolitical perspective of this topic, see generally FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER (Profile Books 2012). The Jewish simplicity,
which still characterizes the Synoptic Gospels, disappears in John’s identification of Christ with
the Stoic-Platonic logos (see Gospel of John, 1:1). The same applies to the Pauline epistles, which
are widely recognized as the true ‘seed’ of Christianity.
51. See GEORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 52-64 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi.
Press 2005) (2003).
52. MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO, supra note 37.
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terms and, consequently, there is no need in it for a nomos in terms of
“division,” “allocation,” and “appropriation” (Nahme) of rights, interests, obligations, and duties.53 Lord Bingham’s lessons on the intrinsic
relationship between the rule of law and the modern democratic state
seem to confirm this suggestion.54 Hence, to understand the “dissipation
of the rule of law into the self-regulation of transnational corporations”55
– that is, into a soft-networked (non-) dimension in which time and
space do not exist – we should first understand that, as Kafka, Derrida,
and Cacciari have persuasively demonstrated, the law can perform its
regulative instances only when (and due to the fact that) the subject
does not enter its open door. Given that it is ontologically impossible to
enter the “open,” the effectiveness of the legal order (also) depends on
the ontological and anthropological constitutive force of the boundary.56
53. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 88-90 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1998) (1958);
HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 179-186 (Penguin 2006) (1963); CARL SCHMITT, THE
NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPEAUM (Gary
Ulmen trans., Telos Publishing Press 2006) (1950); Carl Schmitt, Großraum Versus Universalism, in SPATIALITY, SOVEREIGNTY AND CARL SCHMITT 3 (Stephen Legg ed., Matthew Hannah
trans. Routledge 2013). For a compelling investigation into the implications for the development
of Western philosophy of the manipulative distortion of the term oikonomia, see GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY: FOR A THEOLOGICAL GENEALOGY OF ECONOMY
AND GOVERNMENT (Lorenzo Chiesa trans., Matteo Mandarini trans., 2011); ANDREA
CAVALLETTI, LA CITTÀ BIOPOLITICA: MITOLOGIE DELLA SICUREZZA (2005). Finally, for a
comparison between the economic global order and the infinite order of Hell, see GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, CHURCH AND KINGDOM (Leland de la Durantaye trans., 2010).
54. In Lord Bingham’s words, the very essence of the rule of law is that “all persons and
authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefits of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the
courts.” TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 8 (Penguin 2010); see also BRIAN Z TAMANAHA, ON
THE RULE OF LAW 35 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). According to the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, economic development, and in particular the economic effectiveness of the political
system, rather than its law-applying and law-making procedures, is the principal “condition sustaining democracy.” In particular, while investigating the correlation between development and
democracy, Lipset claimed that:
[i]n the modern world . . . economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high
educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy; it is a mark of the efficiency of the total system. But the stability of a
given democratic system depends not only on the system’s efficiency in modernization, but also
upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system. By effectiveness is meant the actual
performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed forces. . . . Legitimacy
involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.
Seymour M. Lipset, Social Requirements of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 86 (1959); see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 50, at 458–83.
55. Goodrich, Law’s Labour’s Lost, supra note 20, at 309.
56. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER 49–62 (Kevin Attell trans., Stanford Univ. Press
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Consequently, in the global Oikoumene of total uniformity, there is no
need for the Schmittian “exception” either: the sovereign (and thus, political) relationship between the law and those it tries to protect by imposing and/or stimulating its respect makes no appearance.
Before turning to the intimate relationship between universalized
liberalism and the manipulative use of comparative law’s geopolitics, I
would like to specify that Schmitt claimed in 1922 that “[t]oday nothing
is more modern than the onslaught against the political . . . [t]here must
no longer be political problems, only organizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks.”57 Seven years later, while arguing against
what he called “liberal normativism,” Schmitt gave a compelling lecture
in Barcelona on the essence, features, and perils of what he defined as
the “the age of neutralization and depoliticization,” explaining why the
“political” was in danger of disappearing as a human form of life because of the (terrible) fact that what he perceived as “sovereignty” was

1998) (1995). The circumstance that even Lessig’s invisible software code needs to be drafted as
a computer program by someone further demonstrates the law anthropological and ontological
need for a tangible signature. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(Basic Books 1999). For a comparison between the current global order and the Schmittian model
of Großraum power, see Siliquini-Cinelli, supra note 12. It is not the case that the dissolution of
the legal force of the boundary coincided historically with the rise of the “social” – that is, in Arendt’s words, “with the transformation of the private care for private property into a public concern”; this took pace “when wealth became capital, whose chief function was to generate more
capital.” This circumstance, and the “transformation of immobile property into mobile property”
broadly understood, is of pivotal interest for our inquiry because “[t]he emergence of society . . .
from the shadow interior of the household into the light of the public sphere, has not only blurred
the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition
the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizens.”
See ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 53, at 68, 69, and 38. In this sense, it is worth
mentioning that the global-order doctrine echoes two distinct historical moments of great importance: (1) the Sophists’, and in particular Protagoras’s, polemic against nomos in favor of nature, which led to the normativistic reinterpretation of nomos as mere “law” deprived of its spatial
character (yet, while Schmitt would agree with the reconstruction, Heidegger would not); (2) the
Stoic, and in particular Epictetus’s, understanding of “happiness” in terms of euroia biou, a metaphor that indicates, in Arendt’s words, “a free-flowing life, undisturbed by storms, tempests, or
obstacles” and that allowed them to “withdraw from the world while still living it.” See Schmitt,
Großraum Versus Universalism, supra note 53, at 67–83; ARENDT, supra note 45, at 74 and 92.
Teubner’s claim for the invisible boundaries of global law that “are formed not by maintaining a
core ‘territory’ and expanding on a ‘federal’ basis as Kant perceived in terms of nation-states, but
rather ‘by invisible colleges’, ‘invisible markets and branches’, ‘invisible professional communities’, ‘invisible social networks’ that transcend territorial boundaries but nevertheless press for the
emergence of genuinely legal forms” is therefore misleading because, strictly speaking, global
(non-)law has no boundaries at all. See generally Teubner, supra note 36, at 7. See also ZENON
BAŃKOWSKI AND MAKSYMILIAN DEL MAR, Images of Borders and the Politics of Legality and
Identity, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY 61, 77 (Ashgate 2014).
57. POLITICAL ROMANTICISM, supra note 10, at 65.
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no longer a constituent part of our world (Großraum).58 In particular,
Schmitt argued that this depoliticization process involved four steps,
“from the theological to the metaphysical domain, from there to the
humanitarian-moral, and, finally, to the economic domain.”59 Liberal
democracy and “political relativism”60 represent the final stage of this
neutralizing trend. Schmitt built his considerations on Max Weber’s notion of the “demagification of the world” (Entzauberung) and the subsequent fight against the workings of bureaucracy as an instrumental
and networked system of rational, and thus dehumanized relations.61
As Tracy B. Strong writes in the foreword to Schmitt’s Political
Theology, according to Weber, “[b]ureaucracy is the form of social organization that rests on norms and rules and not on persons.”62 It is thus
a form of rule in which there is “objective discharge of business . . . according to calculable rules and without regard of persons.”63 Importantly, although Schmitt insisted on a “sociology of concepts,” rather than a
pure Weberian sociological approach, both Weber’s and Schmitt’s accounts may be considered early objections to central texts of contemporary liberalism, such as Rawls’s, A Theory of Justice.64 In this sense, it
should be kept in mind that even Hayek criticized the constructivist essence of the liberal global thought project. Hayek did so while analyzing the paradoxes of the creation of the so-called “social and economic
human rights” through a compelling analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s, four freedoms and the illusory content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which, according to Hayek, is based upon
“the interpretation of society as a deliberatively made organization by
which everybody is employed.”65

58. The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations, in THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL,
supra note 41, at 82.
59. Id. at 82.
60. POLITICAL ROMANTICISM, supra note 10, at 42.
61. Id. at xxiii,
62. Id. at xxii.
63. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 975 (Guenther Roth trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1968) (1956).
64. The Schmittian inevitable political division is precisely what liberalism has denied by
denying the place of the decision. In particular, Schmitt’s account stands in opposition to Hayek’s
belief that “[t]he basic source of social order . . . is not a deliberate decision to adopt certain
common rules, but the existence among the people of certain opinions of what is right and
wrong.” Consequently, “[t]he ultimate limit of power is . . . not somebody’s will on particular
interests but . . . the concurrence of opinions among members of a particular territorial groups on
rules of just conduct.” See HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 375–77.
65. Id. at 264.
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III. RATIONE IMPERII VERSUS IMPERIO RATIONIS
A. Comparative Law and the Liberal Global Order
This paper’s second claim is that the instrumentalist use of comparative law’s geopolitics has become a powerful tool in the neutralization of both the Schmittian “political” and “sovereign” pursued by the
liberal global order project. To justify this claim, I contend that the increasing importance of the comparative method in our era is mainly due
to the fact that it makes it possible to reveal both the “general” and the
“special” in the legal systems it analyzes. More precisely, in our neorealist global age, comparative law has become extremely useful for at
least three reasons. First, “it helps to identify the circumstances in which
law changes, hence it uncovers the causes of legal development.”66 Second, “a uniform law cannot be achieved by simply conjuring up an ideal
law on any topic.”67 Third, many examples of harmonization efforts that
are preceded by a comparative survey exist.68
In other words, even if the comparative approach has old origins,69
its value as a study and methodology still is because it is rooted in social
comparison, an activity through which “we make sense of the world in
which we live and even understand ourselves.”70 Hence, comparative
law is able to dissolve unconsidered national prejudices, thereby helping
us to uncover how cultures are presented through examining their legal
66. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW ix (Univ. of Georgia 1991);
see also CLASSICS IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Tom Ginsburg, Pier Giuseppe Monateri & Francesco
Parisi eds., 2014); PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (3rd ed., 2007);
OTTO KAHN FREUND, COMPARATIVE LAW AS AN ACADEMIC SUBJECT (Clarendon Press 1965);
HAROLD C GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 1949); KONRAD
ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3rd
ed., 1998).
67. Jan M. Smits, European Private Law and the Comparative Method, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO EUROPEAN UNION PRIVATE LAW 33, 34 (Christian Twigg-Flesner ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
68. E.g. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. For an introduction,
see MICHAEL BRIDGE, SALE OF GOODS (2nd ed , Oxford Univ. Press 2009); COMMENTARY ON
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (Ingeborg H. Schwenzer ed.
2010); INGEBORG H. SCHWENZER ET AL., GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT LAW (Oxford Univ.
Press 2010).
69. When describing the polis as a peculiar isonomy, Herodotus defines for the first time the
three chief forms of government (rule by one, rule by the few, and rule by the many) in BOOK III
80–82. Later, both Plato and Aristotle compare the existing constitutions and forms of government to determine which one was the best. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC BOOKS I-III (2nd ed.,
Hackett Classics 1992) (360 BCE).
70. David S. Clark, History of Comparative Law and Society, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND
SOCIETY 1-36 (David S. Edward Elgar ed., 2012).
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systems.71 Also, a comparative glance assists in furthering international
understanding (Lipset used to say that an observer who knows only one
country knows no countries).72 This is because the ideal task of the
comparative legal scholar is to “be interested in the details of consciousness, dismantling the various mechanisms of meaning production,
and casting irony over interpretive practices.”73
As the success of the New Approaches to Comparative Law
(NACL) doctrine demonstrates,74 comparative law is increasingly gaining international credibility as a way to develop new theories of sovereignty and governance in a framework where the law is perceived less
as a positivistic set of rules and more as a symbolic vestimentum of
global soft power. This growing perception is because of comparative
law’s attractive functionalist or constructivist essence75 or, in other
words, to the circumstance that, as claimed by two of the most prominent comparatists, “[t]he basic methodological principle of all comparative law . . . is that of functionality.”76 That is to say, comparative law
may easily become an attractive device to achieve the desired result.
Unfortunately, while comparative law has become a key discipline,
its instrumentalist use has turned out to be a powerful weapon; it is the
“pen” by which the identity of and differences in law’s geopolitics are
continually written and rewritten.77 In other words, given that legal
transplants can be directed not only at the positivistic content of the law,
but also at the ways through which the content is created, destroyed,
recreated, and generally administered, the impact of the comparative
71. Id.; COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg, Rosalind Dixon & Edward
Elgar eds., 2011); H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN LAW (4th ed., 2010); David S. Clark, Aims of Comparative Law, in ELGAR
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 57–65 (Jan M Smits ed., Edward Elgar Pub., 2006).
72. Lipset, supra note 54.
73. ‘Against Interpretation?’, supra note 2, at xix.
74. See Tamas Dezso Czigler, E-Consumer Protection in the U.S.– The Same Jungle as in
Europe, 4 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013).
75. Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Methods in Comparative Law: An Intellectual Overview,
in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7-24 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012); James Gordley,
The Functional Method, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW: TRADITIONS AND
TRANSITIONS 107-19 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012); Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist
Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 100-30 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday
eds.,2003); see also EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mark Van
Hoecke ed., 2004); PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Maurice Adams & Jacco
Bomhoff eds., 2010); MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW (2014).
76. ZWEIGERT AND KÖTZ, supra note 66, at 34; contra GLENN, supra note 71, at 7.
77. MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO, supra note 37. For a compelling introduction to
the ‘perils’ of comparative law, see F H Lawson, The Field of Comparative Law 61 JURIDICAL
REVIEW 16 (1949); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 10–15 (Univ. of Georgia Press 1993)
(1974).
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method of determining how cultures are mapped through the (legal) traditions that express them via definition of identities has become an issue
that sociopolitical and legal scholars cannot take for granted anymore.78
This is further demonstrated by the fact that the ideal essence of
the comparative method is currently affected by the growing use of
“benchmarking and numeric calculus of performance by world institutional actors.”79 In this way, through the adoption of a sterile and neutral
methodology to which is attributed universal value because it overcomes the historicity of understanding and the anthropological component of the legal discourse,80 the sovereign individual who acts is excluded from the law’s performative domain and replaced by the
apolitical individual who behaves.81 Thus, given the similarities between
the world order pursued by the global governance project and Greimasian totalizing structuralism,82 the increasing development of dehumanized arithmetical calculation (as well as legal language based on
mechanical, and thus neutral, economic models) to support distortive
theories of comparative law should lead us to take into pivotal account
that “[t]he first essential step on the road to total domination is to kill
the juridical person.”83
78. See generally PETER BIRKS, MAPPING THE LAW (Andrew Burros & Alan Roger eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press,2006); PETER BIRKS, STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW
(Charles E.F. Rickett & Ross Grantham eds., Hart 2008); PETER BIRKS, THE CLASSIFICATION OF
OBLIGATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press, 1997); MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO, supra note
37; GEOFFREY SAMUEL, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMON LAW 103-04 (Edward Elgar
ed., 2013) (2014); STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: CATEGORIES AND
CONCEPTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003); Peter
Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 U. W. AUSTL. L. REV. 1 (1996);
Darryn Jensen, The Problem of Classification in Private Law, 31 MELB. U. L. REV. 516 (2007);
Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Can the Common Law Be Mapped?, 55 U. TORONTO L. J. 271 (2005); Igor
Stramignoni, Review Essay: Categories and Concepts: Mapping Maps in Western Legal Thought,
1 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 411 (2012).
79. Horatia Muir Watt, Further Terrains for Subversive Comparison: The Field of Global
Governance and the Public/Private Law Divide, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Pier
Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012) 270, 273.
80. SUPIOT, supra note 20, at 59–77, 84–86, 94–109.
See also ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE (1996); LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE
LAW (2002); LEGALISM (Paul Dresch & Hannah Skoda eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2012); Elizabeth
Mertz and Mark Goodale, Comparative Anthropology of Law, in DAVID CLARK, COMPARATIVE
LAW AND SOCIETY: RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Elgar, ed., 2012).
81. Ranke and Gadamer would agree with this, while Lévi-Strauss, whose intent was to create an all-encompassing science of communication that would include genetics, linguistics, and
anthropology, would probably not.
82. For two recent accounts of how to deal with global legal pluralism, see KEITH C.
CULVER & MICHAEL GIUDICE, LEGALITY’S BORDERS: AN ESSAY IN GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE
(Oxford Univ. Press 2010); PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
83. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 447 (1973).
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In this regard, in addition to the Doing Business reports, the drafting of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) represents another useful example of how the comparative method can be used to
neutralize the geopolitical relationship between the law’s performative
instances and those who live under its empire.84 Unfortunately, by focusing solely on the positivistic dimensions and business implications of
the PECL, private law scholars have never understood that providing a
sterile set of principles through a mere comparison of national private
law rules (and of those norms contained in the UNIDROIT Principles)
annihilates both the political sensibility and sociology behind private
law rules. This demonstrates that the PECL’s drafters have produced the
maximum expression of how the formal “depoliticization” and “dejuridification” pursued by the global-order project has negatively affected
private legal reasoning on the continent.85
The significance of the PECL within the geopolitics of comparative law can also be shown by the reformation of the Israeli Civil Code,
which is unusual, because Israel’s is a hybrid legal order.86 Throughout
the recodification project, reference was made to the UNIDROIT Principles or the PECL.87 Similarly, another example of the power and importance of comparative law in the shaping of national legal rules is the
modernization of the German law of obligations.88 The rules as they are
now are the result of the influence of various forces including foreign
law, comparisons between national legal cultures, references to international conventions, and model rules (such as the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the PECL, and the
84. THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW, pts. 1 & 2 (Hugh Beale & Ole Lando eds., 2000). See also OLE LANDO ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, pt. 3 (2003).
I agree with Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut when they claim that “[t]he European Unification
process is . . . very much built on the traditional constructivist ambitions of comparative law.”
Maurice Adams & Dirk Hheirbaut, Prologomena to the Method and Culture of Comparative
Law, in THE METHOD AND CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Maurice Adams & Dirk Hheirbaut
eds., Hart Publ’g 2014).
85. INGERID S. STRAUME & JOHN F. HUMPHREY, Introduction to DEPOLITICIZATION THE
POLITICAL IMAGERY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 10 (Ingerid S. Straume & John F. Humphrey eds.,
NSU Press 2010).
86. Antonios E. Platsas, The Enigmatic but Unique Nature of the Israeli Legal System, 15
POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 11, 15 (2012).
87. Pablo Lerner & Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, A Civil Code for a Mixed Jurisdiction.
Some Remarks on the Israeli Approach to Codification, in LEGAL CULTURES AND LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS GENERAL REPORTS TO THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 9-10 (Jorge A Sánchez Cordero ed., 2010).
88. Peter Schlechtriem, The German Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations in the Context
of Common Principles and Structures of the Law of Obligations in Europe, OXFORD U. COMP. L.
FORUM (2002), available at http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/schlechtriem2.shtml#fn1anc.
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UNIDROIT Principles).89
The foregoing should be investigated bearing in mind that, while
comparative law has always been directly or indirectly part of the judicial process,,90 its instrumentalist use can influence the outcome of national court cases. This trend demonstrates full well the extent of the
impact of the global-order project over classic, state-based hierarchical
systems of legal authority. Its effects in terms of geopolitical and cultural signification should not, therefore, be taken for granted. For example,
Lord Cooke of Thordon claimed, “the common law of England is becoming gradually less English [because] [i]nternational influences –
from Europe, the Commonwealth and even the United States . . . are
gradually acquiring more and more strength.”91In addition, with respect
to EU law, article 340 (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union deals with the liability of the EU for damage caused by its
servants in the performance of their duties. The treaty explicitly refers
to the “principles common to . . . the Member States.”92 Yet these principles (and EU private law, broadly understood) are somewhat elusive,
and mostly, not really tangible (as is usually the case with supranational phenomena). Not surprisingly, they are to be defined ad nutum
by the European Union’s Court of Justice through the instrumentalist
use of the comparative method.93 Finally, the drafting of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was also influenced by the individualization of what have been described as the “common” traditions
and experiences of various European countries.94 This is a circumstance
we ought not to underestimate. On the one hand, national supreme
89. André Janssen & Reiner Schulze, Legal Cultures and Legal Transplants in Germany, 2
EUROPEAN REV. PRIVATE LAW 225, 238 (2011).
90. GUY CANIVET, ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW BEFORE THE COURTS (2004); BASIL S
MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE COURTROOM AND CLASSROOM, 147-150 (Hart Publishing 2000); BASIL S. MARKESINIS & JOERG FEDTKE, ENGAGING WITH FOREIGN LAW (Hart
Publishing 2009); Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve, Intent on Making Mischief: Seven Ways
of Using Comparative Law, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 25-60 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri
ed., 2012); T.T. Arvind, The ‘Transplant Effect’ in Harmonization 1 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 65, 667 (2010).
91. Robin Cooke, The Road Ahead for the Common Law, in TOM BINGHAM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LAW: A LIBER AMICORUM 688-89 (Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2009).
92. Consolidated Version of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 326/ 50, art.
340, 2012 O.J. 193.
93. Case 17-74, Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European
Cmtys., 1974 E.C.R 01063. See also Kathleen Gutman, The Evolution of the Action for Damages Against the European Union and Its Place in the System of Judicial Protection, 48 COMMON
MARKET L. REV. 695 (2011).
94. Paivi Leino, A European Approach to Human Rights Universality Explored, 71 NORDIC
J. INT’L L., 455, 456 (2002).
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courts are increasingly referring to the judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) to direct their reasoning.95On
the other hand, the ECtHR has claimed the “authority to review even
constitutional provisions. . . to assess their compatibility with the [ECtHR].”96 Yet a real understanding of what Europe and the EU are, and
what being a European signifies, is anything but beyond dispute. This is
demonstrated by the “Europeanisation of Europe” being a “top-down”
legitimizing political process rather than a ‘bottom-up’ one. These
rights have always been conferred from above as a benefit, rather than
exacted from below as a demand.97
What these examples prove is that, in dealing with the ideal essence of the comparative method and the anthropological and biopolitical human need for the law’s performative instances, what makes the
difference is how the guardians of a legal tradition decide to deal with
its geopolitical and ontological signatures is critically important.98
B. Two Possible Reasons Behind the Distortive Use of Comparative
Law’s Geopolitics
One way to explain the foregoing is that European academics are
usually based at state universities and, even though their activity may be
protected by the (constitutional) guarantee of "academic freedom", the
survival of a significant amount of scholarship depends on the funding
provided by international institutions, as well as global and transnational actors, to carry out projects whose guidelines are a priori determined.
Arguably, this compromises the effectiveness of academic and institutional autonomy.99
I believe, however, that there is another reason behind the instrumentalist turn that comparative law and legal reasoning have experienced. I refer particularly to the artificial birth of the Leviathan, which
has led to the positivist dictum that has rendered “law” synonymous
with “legislation,” or in other words, to the victory of the concept that
law is a purely political instrument of the rational order (or raison
95. See Cadder v. HM Advocate. [2010] UKSC 43, (Scot.), in which Lord Hope made reference to several judicial decisions through which the national law in France and Ireland was altered for the purpose of satisfying the well-known Salduz judgment.
96. Yaniv Rozani, The Theory and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional Amendments, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557 (2013).
97. See generally Luca Siliquini-Cinelli and Bétrice Schütte, supra note 42.
98. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, SIGNATURA RERUM (Bollati Boringhieri ed., 2008); THE
KINGDOM AND THE GLORY (Lorenzo Chiesa trans., Stanford Univ. Press ed., 2011) (2007).
99. CARL SCHMITT, THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES 73
(George Schwab & Erna Hilfstein trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2008) (1938).
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d’état) imposed by the ruler.100 This revolutionary break has deprived
jurists of their role as guardians of the law’s uncanny presence. With the
exception of Germany, the birth of the modern European nation-state as
an artificial and political creature has monopolized political action and
restricted jurists to a reductive role, completely opposed to the prestigious role they had during the Middle Ages and Renaissance. In this
sense, it is not surprising that the spread of theories and methods of
comparative law aimed at transcending the political dominium of the
Leviathan as a technically completed magnum-artificium (or magnus
homo) took place alongside the so-called “international institutionalization of comparative law,” which officially began with the constitutive
meeting of the Académie International de Droit Comparé in Geneva in
1924.101 Its main achievements were obtained during the post-World
Word II period, particularly between 1949 and 1951 by American and
European comparatists.102
The discovery and consequent application of the first paragraph of
Justinian’s Digest led the medieval glossators in a revolutionary move
to displace the divine figure of the king and his dual function as “lord”
and “minister of justice” (from ratione Imperii to imperio rations)103 It
was the discovery of the Digest that made it possible for the law to be
taught and studied in the West as an independent science in the late
1000s and 1100s.104 This is how what Goodrich has defined as the ‘first
revolution in interpretation’ took place.105 As Berman correctly writes,
“[t]he law that was first taught and studied systematically . . . was not
the prevailing law; it was the law contained in an ancient manuscript
which had come to light in an Italian library toward the end of the elev-

100. Id.
101. Clark, History of Comparative Law and Society, supra note 70 at 28.
102. Id. at 29–31. While inquiring comparatists’ discomfort with politics, David Kennedy has
defined this trend, and its need for neutrality, in terms of a reaction to the “post-war trauma.” See
David W. Kennedy, The Politics and Methods of Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES 345–437 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds.,2003). On why and how this trend
recalls the pre-positivistic approach of the natural lawyers, see James Gordley, The Universalist
Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 31-45 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday
eds.,2003). For a critique of the “allegation that traditional comparative law obeys a secret political agenda of hegemony and domination,” see Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke Comparative
Law Beyond Post-Modernism, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 800 (2000).
103. Intersititium and Non-Law, supra note 20 at 213.
104. For discussion of the idea that law began to be taught as a distinct science in the 1000s
and 1100, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (Harvard Univ. Press 1983).
105. Goodrich, supra note 20 at 303; see also Intersititium and Non-Law, supra note 20 at
213.
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enth century. The manuscript reproduced” the Digest.106 This is why, in
commenting on Maitland’s considerations, Berman writes that the
twelfth century was not a legal century but the legal century, “the century in which the Western legal tradition was born.”107 Notwithstanding
the subordination of reason (and mind, broadly understood) to theology,108 Andrea da Isernia’s Latin locution “raro principes iurista invenitur”109 proves that it was in those crucial years, and not before, that the
idea emerged on the continent that law’s mythical essence is “holy” and
those who deal with it should be scientists whose dominium over the
law’s performative instances allows them to gather together and constitute a new, separated holy corpus, namely the militia legum (or militia
literata or, as Baldus defined it, militia doctoralis), to be ontologically
compared to the militia coelestis of the Church and the armed aristocratic militia of the nobles (Sir Edward Coke, who claimed that the
commfon law is the embodiment of the reasoning of many generations
of learned men, would not agree with that).110 This is probably one of
the most powerful demonstrations that the law is the product of both the
norm and decision.
However, the constructivist creation of the nation-state confined
the imperio rationis and sovereign will of the continental jurist to a passive role by bringing back the mystic dimension of the ratione Imperii
to the supreme level of law’s annunciation and administration.111 The
106. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION 121-22 (Harvard Univ. Press 1983).
107. Id. at 120.
108. CHARLES WEBSTER, FROM PARACELSUS TO NEWTON: MAGIC AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN SCIENCE (Dover Publications 2005)(1982); SUPIOT, supra note 20, at 51-52.
109. CRISTINA CONSTANTINI, LA LEGGE E IL TEMPIO: STORIA COMPARATA DELLA
GIUSTIZIA INGLESE (Carocci 2007).
110. The fact that, in his INSTITUTES, Coke claimed that the common law is “nothing but reason” should not confuse the interpreter. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 18th ed. 1999). Given what is stated in
John 1:1 (Ἐνἀρχῇἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγοςἦν πρὸςτὸνθεόν, καὶ θεὸςἦν ὁ λόγος’), according to both
the scholastic and humanist legal philosophers, reason is a natural faculty of the human mind given by God. Thus reason is not, as Coke understood it, the specialist feature of those ‘grave and
learned men’ of English law. In Berman’s words, “for Coke, the artificial reason of the English
common law was the unique reason, logic, sense, and purposes of the historically rooted law of
the English nation, a repository of the thinking and experience of the English common lawyers
over many centuries.” See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 243 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2006). Coke’s notion of both the common law and the Common law was accepted and developed further by Sir Matthew Hale, the creator of the historical theory of jurisprudence, which profoundly influenced Hayek’s thoughts on how law rises, evolves, and eventually
dies. The fact that Hobbes considered Coke’s conception to be false and misleading is the key to
understand the essence of the political dicta of the Leviathan over legal reasoning. Id. at 257–60.
111. See generally Schmitt, Großraum Versus Universalism, supra note 53.
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state, through its officials, became the only guardian of law’s uncanny
presence and legal reasoning. From being the active protagonist of the
stage, jurists figuratively became the passive part of the audience. Quoting Hayek’s account of the role of the lawyer in political evolution, jurists became “an unwitting tool, a link in a chain of events that [they do]
not see as a whole.”112 Kelsen’s closing statements in Pure Theory of
Law demonstrate this shift well. According to Kelsen, who was a neoKantian student of Rudolf Stammler, law is nothing other than the normative (self-supporting) domain of the state, and only the state’s officials (among whom stands the judge) are entitled to decide what falls
within the law’s purview and what does not113 (Schmitt, who insisted
that “all law is situational law”114 would not agree with that.) In the light
of legal positivism’s political sin, this means that there is no space for
what is not realized, spoken, and written by the state (the word of the
state is eternal, all else is fleeting), because, in Schmitt’s words, all law
“is simultaneously a problem of the existence of the state order”.115
Hence, it is no longer believed that “what is non-legal is always necessary to make law properly legal.”116
To understand this shift fully, one should note that it was in the
modern age, and not before, that the mechanistic philosophy of nature
as the tool of self-assertion was adopted.117 The fact that the individual,
and thus will as opposed to reason, makes no appearance in that which
is freed from any metaphysical reference such as scientific laws118 is
therefore anything but a coincidence.
Consequently, under the imperative will and dominium politicum
et regale of the sovereign Leviathan,119 civilian lawyers could no longer
be considered the guardians of law’s uncanny presence. Liberalism, focused on norms rather than power, and whose “horizon of explanation is
framed by reason . . . and personal well-being”120 rather than will, is
aimed at eliminating the personal from the concept of law, has played a
112. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 66.
113. See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of California, Berkley ed., 1976).
114. POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 4, at 13.
115. Id. at 26.
116. COSTAS DOUZINAS, RONNIE WARRINGTON & SHAUN MCVEIGH, POSTMODERN
JURISPRUDENCE 26 (Routledge 1993).
117. HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE 151 (Robert M. Wallace
trans., MIT Press Paperback ed., 1985).
118. WEBSTER, supra note 109; see also OUT OF EDEN, supra note 12, at 33-35.
119. The Hobbesian sovereign is, it should be noted, the only one to preserve the features of
the state of nature in terms of ius contra omnes. See SCHMITT, supra note 101.
120. OUT OF EDEN, supra note 12, at 53.

SILIQUINI-CINELLI_FINAL_FOR_PUB

2015]

2/24/2016 2:07 PM

The Age of ‘Depoliticisation’ and ‘Dejuridification’

239

significant role in taking this shift farther.121 Given the role that the
normative thinking of the liberal tradition has played in this process, it
is truly astounding that the drastic, manipulative change of the concept
of law and of legal reasoning was first fully spotted in 1973 by Hayek,
who vehemently claimed that “if the principles which at present guide
[this] process are allowed to work themselves out to their logical consequences, law as we know it as the chief protection of the freedom of the
individual is bound to disappear.”122
Notwithstanding his critique of Schmitt, and thus of the sovereign’s particularistic will in law and legal reasoning,123 Hayek warned us
about the perils of a dimension in which legal thinking is (instrumentally) governed “to such an extent by new conception of the functions of
law”124 that its evolution would (sadly) lead to the transformation of the
system of abstract rules of just conduct into a system of mere rules of
organization. To justify his claim, he maintained that
“[f]rom the conception that legislation is the sole source of law
derive two ideas . . . the first of these is the belief that there
must be a supreme legislator whose power cannot be limited,
because this would require a still higher legislator, and so on in
an infinite regress. The other is that anything laid down by the
supreme legislator is law and only that which expresses his
will is law.”125
To recap, the modern European nation-state, with the exception of
Germany where universities maintained an effective role due to the absence of a unitary political model of state power,126 has monopolized political action and restricted continental jurists to a reductive role completely opposed to the prestigious one they filled during the Middle
Ages and Renaissance. As lawyers, we ought not to take the theoretical
dimensions and practical consequences of this revolution for granted.Being an ideal object, law always needs a corpus to show and prove
121. Kahn correctly notes that liberalism’s task may have its historical origins in the political
efforts to free law from the king. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 12 at 5, 79, 132–37.
122. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 64.
123. Id. at 68. This critique seems, however, to lose its strength when Hayek himself argues,
“[i]t is meaningless to speak of a right to a condition which nobody has the duty, or perhaps even
the power, to bring about.” Id. at 262.
124. Id. at 64.
125. Id. at 87. The greatest promoters of this idea were Bodin, Bacon, Hobbes, and Austin.
126. The German exception has been carefully analyzed by MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL
DIRITTO, supra note 37. For an introduction, see INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN THE AGE OF
ENLIGHTENMENT (Morigiwa Yasutomo, Michael Stolleis, & Jean-Louis Halpérin eds., Springer
2011). See also JAMES GORDLEY, THE JURISTS (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
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its historical existence.127 Thus, in relation to the revolutionary process
of insular signification of politics and law as expressed by the Schmittian link between localization (Ortung) and ordering (Ordnung), the new
Leviathan, an exceptional creature to the Holy Roman Empire, needed a
visible and tangible platform of ontological recognition and legitimation.128 Such a platform was finally found in both the national constitutions and codes, whose aim was to protect the Civil law tradition in its
various localizations through instrumentalist and constructivist approaches to law’s sublimity.129 Just as the noun “sculpture” needs a statue to present itself in a visible and tangible entity, the new artificial local nomos became nothing more than a “positive object” (or
construction, or fact) that lacked any transcendent normative significance.
The foregoing may help our understanding of why it is possible to
argue that the modern dimension of the Civil law tradition is composed
of a particular mix of methods of education and instruction, as well as a
narration of historical facts and memories. What legal scholarship underwent during the artificial creation of the continental nation-state was
not just a change in its size (from being Commune Europaeum, as it became after the Corpus Juris was discovered, to being individualistic and
encapsulated in the political dominium of the new local sovereign),130
but also in its essence and purposes. The inevitable consequence of the
revolutionary “aspatial turn” undergone by law and legal reasoning was
that their tangible representations began to be instrumentally administered by politicians and bureaucrats to achieve contingent sociopolitical
results, rather than to preserve their essence.131
In this way, the juris periti of continental Europe (with the exception of Germany) lost the leading role they had during the Middle Ages
and Renaissance, and became mere officials of the sovereign state’s
longa manus (that is to say, of the parliament and judiciary).132
The artificial action of the modern continental European nationstate conceived by the constructivist, intentional approach to both sociopolitical and legal thought thus posed a genealogical-anthropological
127. See HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 35.
128. Luca Siliquini-Cinelli, Imago Veritas Falsa: For a (Post-)Schmittian Decisionist Theory
of Law, Legal Reasoning, and Judging, 39 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 118
(2014).
129. See id.
130. See T. S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in THE SACRED WOOD 27 (Dover
1998) (1921).
131. See Schmitt, Großraum Versus Universalism, supra note 38, at 50-51.
132. Id. at 52.
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problem for legal scholarship because the European nation-state forced
legal scholarship to lose its guiding role (and prestige) as militia legum.
Jurists went from being the custodians of law’s uncanny presence, fostered by the activity of such academics as Irnerius, who studied and
taught the Holy Roman Empire’s “corpus juris”,133 to being neutral tools
of a process of events that they neither led nor saw as a whole.134 As a
consequence, it became necessary to completely rethink the notion and
essence of the jurisprudentia in terms that were unknown until that
moment. The modern and positivistic dimension of law brought about
by secularization meant that law and the law-making and law-decision
processes became products of the affirmation of the rational voluntas of
the “political” in Schmittian terms. All over Europe, law ceased to be
the revelation of a ratio juris, or science of justice, discovered and
taught by a few juris periti, and became synonymous with legislation as
product of the deliberative will of the constituted political ruler (auctoritas non veritas facit legem).135
IV. CONCLUSION
Comparative law usually refers to the positivistic comparison of
two or more legal systems, or the laws of those systems, on a particular
issue. Its aim, it is usually maintained, is to find similarities or differences among various targeted legal systems. Yet, as this paper contends,
comparative law is anything but about “taking pictures” and both its official and “occult” essences may also play an important role in the formation or destruction of a spatial (and, thus, geopolitical) ontology. This
means that if we decide to apply Spencer Brown’s logico-mathematical
model to cultural constructions and distinctions,136 comparative law may
turn out to be a powerful tool for both protecting and neutralizing the
anthropological and sociopolitical space between them.
Importantly, the practice of dissolution of boundaries finds a valuable ally in the misleading belief, in Hyland’s words, that “all developed
societies confront the same problems.”137 In this regard, to fully understand McEvoy’s claim that one day, “it will be paradoxical to argue
133. MICHAEL BERTRAM CROWE, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF THE NATURAL LAW 87 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1977).
134. See generally FREUND, supra note 66.
135. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, supra note 9, at 409.
136. Spencer Brown’s First Law of Construction prescribes as follows: ‘Draw a distinction.
Call it the first distinction. Call the space in which it is drawn the space severed or cloven by the
distinction’. See G. SPENCER BROWN, LAWS OF FORM 3 (The Julian Press ed., 1972).
137. RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 69 (Oxford University
Press 2009).
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against the harmonization and even the unification of the laws around
the globe: legally, here will be everywhere,”138 it should first be understood that the instrumentalist use of comparative law’s geopolitics is related to the fact that the notion of a spatial (and, thus, geopolitical) ontology is highly controversial. This is why, given the existential link
between textual representation and legal domain, it is reasonable to argue that the double-faceted nature of law (that is, its practical discourse
and theoretical ideal, as described by Peter Goodrich139) is constantly at
stake when the comparative method is used to administer the geopolitical signature of law’s regulative instances.
Delving into this perspective, the foregoing has claimed that the
manipulative use of comparative law’s geopolitics seems to be aimed at
overcoming the political monopoly of legal reasoning as imposed by the
artificial birth of the Leviathan. In fact, this distortive view of comparative law appears to be in line with the doctrine aimed at creating the
“aspatial” and intangible sociopolitical, juridical and economic global
order that transcends the current state’s political imposition and ontological dimensions. The deliberative law-making process brought about
by the French Revolution and its constructivist rationalism are the obstacle to overcome, and the “cohabitation” of different national legal
systems the problem to solve. If, as Arendt has persuasively claimed,
the anthropological function of positive law is “to erect boundaries and
establish channels of communication between men whose community is
continually endangered by the new men born into it,”140 then it is quite
evident that what the liberal global-order project challenges is the delimiting constitutive force of the boundary, and thus of traditions. The
fact that the global spatial turn that legal and sociopolitical theories are
undergoing is aimed at overcoming the classic idea of space, as a representative surface, is testament to this.141 The intangible “open”,142 or He-

138. SEBASTION MCEVOY, DESCRIPTIVE AND PURPOSIVE CATEGORIES OF COMPARATIVE
LAW, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 144-65 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri 2012).
139. PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW 108–09 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson eds., 1990);
see also LAW AND IMAGE (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1999).
140. ARENDT, supra note 66, at 465.
141. For an introduction to this topic, see FRANZ VON BENDA-BECKMANN & KEEBET VON
BENDA-BECKMANN ET. AL, SPATIALIZING LAW (Ashgate 2009); HARM DE BLIG, THE POWER OF
PLACE (Oxford Univ. Press 2011); HARM DE BLIJ, WHY GEOGRAPHY MATTERS (Oxford Univ.
Press, 2nd ed. 2012); Pietro Costa, Uno ‘Spatial Turn’ Per La Storia Del Diritto? Una Rassegna
Tematica (A ‘Spatial Turn’ for Legal History? A Tentative Assessment), Max Planck Institute for
European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 07, 2013.
142. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE OPEN: MAN AND ANIMAL (Kevin Attell trans., Stanford Univ.
Press 2004) (2002).
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gelo-Marxist post-historical dimension,143 with its formal apolitical and
legally neutral essence and instable non-substance, is what rests in front
of us (with the understanding that hen kai pan – all is one144).
In an age in which, as Supiot noted, “[t]ime . . . must be a homogenous and quantifiable given [and] space must be continuous, cleared of
any obstacle to the free circulation of goods, workers and capital,”145 the
“global governance-distortive comparative law” alliance has made it
easier to “discover” the land of the figuratively unspoken and unwritten
as the smooth and rectilinear territory that lies over what is created by
the constructivist political interventions of the modern nation-state and
where exceptions, or miracles, are no longer needed. The next phase
(which is currently taking place) will be about forcing the global-order
citizens to live in the totalizing Oikoumene, that is the “aspatial” and intangible terra incognita (to be intended as a new manifestation of Descartes’s terra firma146) in which spaces and identities are innocent and
indifferent because they have been annihilated by the leveling and conformist demands of the global (open) society.147 What Huntington describes as the “increased salience of cultural identity”148 is anything but
a spontaneous reaction to this trend of dissolution.
In addition to Mathias M. Siems’ claim that comparative law will
inevitably be irrelevant in an age of totalitarian transnational convergence,149 I perceive two other perils behind the universalization of liberal thought and its alliance with the manipulative use of comparative
law’s geopolitics.
First, the world is mainly shaped and characterized by its sociology of law, historicity of politics, and logic of memory. The practical application of any theory that transcends the ontological and cultural dimensions of the world’s spatiality will turn out to be more painful than
any legal or sociopolitical scholar could ever imagine.150
143. ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF HEGEL (James H. Nichols
trans., Allan Bloom ed., 1980) (1947).
144. Lessing’s statement should not be confused with that of Heraclitus. See Martin
Heidegger, Logos, in EARLY GREEK THINKING 59–78 (David Farrell Krell & Frank A. Capuzzi
eds Harper 1984) (1951).
145. SUPIOT, supra note 20, at 97.
146. The term “terra firma” was used by Hegel while describing Descartes’ achievement in
individualizing the cogito. On the Descartes-Hegel dichotomy, see MARTIN HEIDEGGER, FOUR
SEMINARS 27, 37 (Andrew J. Mitchell & François Raffoul trans., Indiana Univ. Press 2012)
(1966).
147. See AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 51.
148. HUNTINGTON, supra note 43, at 129.
149. Mathias M. Siems, Legal Originality, 28 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL ST. 147 (2008); Mathias
M. Siems, The End of Comparative Law 2 J. OF COMP. L. 133 (2007).
150. See generally PIERRE LEGRAND, FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE (WEJ Tjeenk Will-
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The second peril is related to the paradox of the methodology used
by those comparative legal scholars who support the WTO’s global revolution. In trying to reclaim the active role that the French Revolution
and the Leviathan’s artificial birth deprived them, legal scholars are using comparative law and legal reasoning in the same revolutionary way
that was spread by constructivist rationalism to create, destroy, and recreate the sociopolitical and legal order for instrumentalist purposes. In
other words, the promoters of the universalized liberalism are using the
same constructivist methodology prompted by the Legendrian “logic of
assembling,” which inevitably implies an a priori deconstruction, and
through which the political has imposed its will over a given territory.
The only difference in this recursive Machiavellian trend lies in its current functionalist, apolitical, and legally neutral form.
To conclude, the lesson to be learned from the nullification of Homo juridicus is that, instead of acting in the way described in this paper,
comparative lawyers should dedicate their efforts to discovering the
“unofficial” or figuratively “impossible” which lies behind the objects
of their inquiries. This should be done by combining traditional notions
and unexplored conceits of law and legal reasoning through a multidisciplinary approach capable of understanding how cultures are not only “mapped” through the legal traditions that express them via definition
of identities, but also how they are contaminated by distortive “processes of meaning production as social and political realities.”151

ink tras., Schoorddijk Institute 1999); LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION
(Princeton Univ. Press 2006). Contra, Watson, supra notes 66 and 77; FAILURES OF THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION (Scottish Academic Press 1988); COMPARATIVE LAW (Vandeplas 2003).
151. MONATERI, GEOPOLITICA DEL DIRITTO, supra note 37 at 22.

